

Distributed Systems

Winter Term 2024/25

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Stand: January 9, 2025



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
Winter Term 2024/25

11 Fault Tolerance

Contents

- Introduction
- Process elasticity
- Reliable communication
- Recovery

Literature







Concepts

- Failure: external incorrect behavior (system no longer keeps its promises)
- **Error**: (unobserved) incorrect internal state
- Fault: physical defect (in HW or SW) causing the error
 - fault can be transient, periodic or permanent
- **Fault tolerance**: system does not fail despite a fault
- Requirement for reliable systems:
 - \rightarrow availability: p(system is working at time t)
 - → reliability: $p(system is working in time interval <math>\Delta t)$
 - safety: no major damage if system fails
 - maintainability: effort for "repair" after a failure

Failure models

| Crash failure | Server halts |
|---------------------|--|
| Omission failure | Server is not responding to requests |
| Receive omission | Server doesn't receive incoming requests |
| Send omission | Server doesn't send messages |
| Timing failure | Response time is outside the specification |
| Response failure | Server's response is incorrect |
| Value failure | Only the value of the answer is wrong |
| State transition f. | Incorrect control flow in server |
| Byzantine failure | Random answers at arbitrary time |

Further distinction: can the client detect the failure or not?


Failure masking through redundancy

- ► Fault tolerant system must hide faults from other processes
- Most important technique: redundancy
 - → information redundancy: additional "check bits" (e.g., CRC)
 - time redundancy: repetition of faulty actions
 - physical redundancy: important components are provided multiple times
- Example: TMR, triple modular redundancy
 - components are replicated three times
 - majority decision for the results
 - protects against (Byzantine) failure of a single replicated component




Example for TMR

Without redundancy




With TMR






Example for TMR

Without redundancy



With TMR



Objective: Protection Against Process Failure


- ► By replicating processes in groups
 - message to the group is received by all members
 - usually with totally ordered multicast
- Questions:
 - organization of the groups?
 - flat (symmetrical) vs. hierarchical (central coordinator)
 - group administration, synchronous join / exit
 - necessary number of replicas?
 - \blacktriangleright k fault tolerant: failure of k processes can be tolerated
 - ► for silent failures: $\geq k + 1$ Processes
 - ➡ for Byzantine failures: $\geq 2k + 1$ processes
 - agreement in faulty systems?



Agreement in faulty systems

Agreement is impossible with unreliable communication

- two army problem
- Agreement of faulty processes with reliable communication
 - → Byzantine agreement problem (*byzantinische Generäle*)
 - \Rightarrow agreement only possible if $> \frac{2}{3}$ of the processes work correctly



Distributed Systems (12/15)



Objective: Protection Against Communication Failures


- ➡ Point-to-point communication (^{INST} RN_I)
 - TCP masks omission failures, but not crash failures
- Client/server communication (reg 2.1)
 - possible failures:
 - server not found
 - lost request
 - server crash while processing the request
 - Iost reply
 - client crash after sending the request
- Group communication (^{III} 7.3)
- Distributed commit (188 7.4)

11.4 Recovery



Objective: System Recovery After an Error

- ► Forward error recovery: go to a correct new state
- Backward error recovery: go to a correct earlier state
 - i.e. reset to a consistent cut
 - regular backup to stable storage (*checkpointing*)
- Independent checkpointing
 - processes save their state independently of each other
 - problem: domino effect



11.4 Recovery ...



- Coordinated checkpoints
 - ➡ Chandy/Lamport algorithm (^{IISF} 6.4)
 - alternatively: blocking 2 phase protocol
 - problem: requires to reset all processes
- Local checkpoints with message logging
 - goal: restore the crashed process to a state consistent with the current state of the other processes
 - reset to last checkpoint and restore the received messages

